This paper is written by authors from technical and economic elds, motivated to nd a common language and views on the problem of the optimal use of information in model estimation. The center of our interest is the natural condition of control a common assumption in the Bayesian estimation in technical sciences, which may be violated in economic applications. In estimating dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models, typically only a subset of endogenous variables are treated as measured even if additional data sets are available. The natural condition of control dictates the exploitation of all available information, which improves model adaptability and estimates eciency. We illustrate our points on a basic RBC model.
Introduction
Since the seminal paper by Peterka (1981) , it has been well understood in the technical sciences that on the way from the Bayesian formula to the standard recursive least square method for an ARX model estimation, or the Kalman lter estimation, several assumptions about information contained in observed input and output variables must be adopted. While such assumptions are well justied and easy to interpret in technical applications like LQG observer-based state feedback or adaptive control, the technical assumptions may be violated in some other areas like economics.
Our attention is focused on the natural condition of control (henceforth NCC or condition) . We would like to stimulate the discussion on the proper use of the information available to econometricians and on the adaptation of theoretical model concepts to particular estimation algorithms. We review the development of model estimation from a conceptual Bayesian solutionresulting in a generic functional recursion on conditioned probability density functions (c.p.d.f.) to famous Kalman lter equations. We demonstrate the loss of optimality in the case when the assumptions used for the development of the standard Kalman lter are not satised.
The natural condition of control is an assumption made in the control system literature that simplies the algorithm for the optimal estimation of unknown variables like parameters or state (latent) variables using the Kalman Filter. The condition says that if an external observer (econometrician/statistician) simultaneously observes and controls the system, then his control decisions, if optimal, do not provide any additional information about the state of the system, and vice versa.
The violation of NCC is dicult to detect in the data. It may be more of an argument than a directly testable hypothesis. The problem is dierent from that of model misspecication which manifests itself in residuals, shock estimates, or inconsistent, model implied expectations. But if econometricians and economic agents with a signicant market power objectively know that the condition does not hold (i.e. there are observed control variables that are not explicitly included in their models while they should be and thus the NCC is violated), the NCC entitles them to use that knowledge in their favor.
In contrast to many economic applications, the NCC is a credible assumption in the technical sciences. The observer and controller are one person, the system under his control is well identied, and he uses algorithms that lead to optimal estimation and decisions. On the other hand, in economic applications it is almost always dicult to argue that the condition holds, because the observer (econometrician) is almost always dierent from the controller. The econometrician observes the real-time decisions (about tax revenues, production, consumption or prices) with a substantial time delay.
To avoid this problem, we assume that the models here describe economic agents with signicant market power. Natural candidates for the controllerobserver in economics are policy institutions like monetary or scal authorities which observe the markets' behavior and, most importantly, have eective tools to inuence them. The NCC does not apply to economic agents in perfectly competitive markets because their size prevent their behavior from impacting the aggregate markets. The condition may apply to the abstract concept of a representative agent (which we do not explore here), or agents with a signicant market power such as policy institutions.
We review the condition's validity for the estimation of dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models. We choose them because they have become the norm for an optimal policy and decision analysis in policy institutions. At the same time, they are exactly the class of economic models for which the NCC is the most relevant because they capture optimal decisions.
There are two direct implications of the NCC on DSGE models. First, we can improve the eciency of our estimates. Second, because the observed control variable is a result of optimal decisions in these models, we can use that variable to infer the encoded underlying information to improve our own knowledge about the modeled system. The performance of our own model can benet if the underlying model of the particular optimal decision is of a better quality than ours.
We show that the choice of observable variables matters. There are many decision variables that are implicit in the DSGE models, but the variables have direct observable counterparts such as labor income, capital income, or all kinds of fees or tax revenues. For model dynamics, they are of second-order importance because they do not carry any extra information for the aggregate dynamics, because output, prices, and interest rates carry the entire set of information. But from the estimation point of view, the variables, if observed, carry an important piece of information from which we can infer the beliefs of the other (representative) agents with higher precision and use them to improve our own (policy authority) beliefs. Every decision is a DSGE model is, by denition, optimal. And by the construction NCC, every decision variable must be present in the estimation. Otherwise the Kalman lter does not provide optimal estimates.
The NCC provides a theoretical explanation and support, for example, to the literature on the choice of observable variables (Guerron-Quintana, 2010), or DSGE models in a data rich environment (Boivin and Giannoni, 2006) . Guerron-Quintana (2010) addresses the question of why one should be concerned with the choice of observable? He experiments with dierent sets of observables, and on a standard New Keynesian model he shows the eects that their choice have on the parameter estimates and overall model dynamical behavior. At rst sight his approach may appear as data mining, because it is a very data intensive analysis, but in the light of our argument, Guerron-Quintana exploration and ndings may be justied by natural-condition-of-control arguments.
Our arguments also go a similar direction like in Boivin and Giannoni (2006) who propose a framework for exploiting information from a large datasets to improve the estimation of DSGE models. In comparison to the data-rich literature we provide justication why the use of all available information in estimation is a must: it is the dictate of the natural condition of control. In contrast to Boivin and Giannoni, who work with empirical relationships, we use only the information that can be linked directly to a decision process captured by the model. 1 In that respect we are also using 1 From the logic of NCC, the methodology proposed in Schorfheide, Sill and Kryshko (2010) may be viewed as an inecient use of available information. The o-model variables, if relevant at all, should be used to update the information about the model states (variables, endogenous factors), instead of being treated exogenously. the information springing from cross-equation restrictions.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we review the derivation of the basic Kalman lter equations from an engineering perspective. It will help us to understand the motivation and consequences of the natural condition of control. In the third section, we show how the engineering world maps in to the world of dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models. In the fourth section, we illustrate our points on a neoclassical growth model.
State Estimation and Output Prediction
In engineering, the typical motivation of parameter and/or state estimation is the optimal control problem. The denition of the model is then implied by this task. Consider a discrete-time dynamic system depicted in Figure 1 with the observable/measurable input sequence u t and output sequence y t and some hidden variables that can be interpreted as the system parameters θ or system state x t . The input sequence enters in a closed loop, in which the control decision is based on the system states estimates. 
The set of c.p ) for τ = t = 1, ..., t + T is a general description of the law by which the input u τ is generated. We will call this set of c.p.d.f.s as the control law. Note the information delay in the control law;
while the input u τ is applied to the system to generate its output in the τ -th period, the output y τ is not available to calculate the control law u τ .
2.State Estimation
If there exists a hidden (latent) variable x t of xed dimension such that
it is called the state of the system. The state of the system x t constrains all the information about the system history that is relevant to predict the values {x t+1 , y t }. Using the state denition above, the output model can be 2 In engineering applications it is typically assumed that a continuous process is observed at regular intervals τ = tT s with sampling period T s and the input is constant during the sampling period, i.e. u(τ ) = u t for tT s ≤ τ < (t + 1)T s .
obtained as a marginal distribution
and the state transition model as a conditioned distribution
This reects the fact that for the prediction of state x t+1 , the information about the output in the t-th period is available and should be incorporated in the optimal prediction (see the sampling scheme in Figure 2 ). To calculate the output prediction
each step of the recursion. That is the point at which the NCC comes in to play.
Suppose the information about the state p(x t |D t−1 ) based on the data up to time t − 1 is available. This information can be updated after a new input-output observation {u t , y t } has been obtained using the Bayes formula
where the properties of the state and the natural condition of control for the state estimation (Peterka, 1981) p(x t |D t−1 , u t ) = p(x t |D t−1 ) are used to get the second term.
The NCC assumption cannot be deduced from the properties of the dynamic system itself but rather from the process of information accumulation.
In the technical context, its interpretation is twofold: 
. If the state-estimation and control is performed by the same subject, the system input is based only on the available data and is not modied by the state estimate, which does not provide any new information for the calculation of the control law.
General Equilibrium Models
Now we turn our attention to the dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models. Their (log)linear form is
where x t is a (n × 1) vector of endogenous variables (log-deviations from their steady state), and ε t is a (k × 1) vector of unobservable exogenous i.i.d. shocks. For a simple notation, we assume that n = k. This assumption will be relaxed in the later discussion. Γ 0 (θ), Γ 1 (θ), Γ 2 (θ) and Γ 3 (θ) are time invariant matrices of structural parameters. Their elements are functions of deep structural parameters, θ. E t (.) is the rational expectation operator conditional on the model M and information available to the economic agents at time t the information matrix is Ω t ∈ (x t , x t−1 , ..., x 0 , ε t , M ). The structural matrices Γ 0 (θ), Γ 1 (θ), Γ 2 (θ) and Γ 3 (θ) are such that the model has unique and stable equilibrium.
Solving for the rational expectations E t (.), model (1) has a minimum state representation
Equation (2) characterizes the dynamic equilibrium in the reduced form.
A(θ) and B(θ) are functions of Γs and through them they are functions of the deep structural parameters θ. The model states x t are linked to their observed counterparts via the measurement equation
where y t is (m × 1) vector of observable variables, and C is the (m × n) (usually identity) matrix that maps the model variables into y t .
Equations (2) and (3) 3 When estimating (2) and (3), it is standard to assume that (i) model (1) is a reasonable representation of the world and the decisions taken in it, and (ii) y t is the only information that the outside observer has available to estimate and evaluate x t .
If an external observer does not use all available information, the NCC is violated and the Kalman ltering may not be optimal, which sacrices the estimation eciency of parameters and unobservable variables. We consider two instances in which the NCC is violated.
Learning from others
If any additional information about the system state is available to calculate the control law, the standard Kalman lter is not optimal from the Bayesian inference/information accumulation point of view. That is why some applications in the economic literature may not fully comply with the NCC assumption: typically in multi-agent environment where individual agents operate based on dierent information content, the control action of one agent may provide additional information to the remaining agents,
i.e. p(x t |D t−1 ) = p(x t |D t−1 , u t ). If this additional information is not used to evaluate their optimal control strategy, their behavior is not optimal from the Bayesian inference/information accumulation point of view.
As an example, assume a statistician observing a linear system controlled by (complete information) state feedback. Then his (noisy) observation of controlled variable u t = −Kx t + e u t provides signicant information about the state.
If the statistician knows the control law K, interpreting the control variable u t as an additional observation dened by c.p.d.f. p(u t |x t ) = p e u (u t + Kx t ) in parallel to the observed outputs y t = Cx t + Du t + e y t dened by p(y t |x t , u t ) = p e y (y t − Cx t − Du t ), the optimal data update step of state estimation process (Kalman lter) should cover input update step
and output update step
If the statistician does not know the control law K, he is not able to incorporate this information into the state estimation process. However, if he knows that NCC are not satised 4 and he is sure that the observed control variable u t provides additional information about the state x t , he may try to recover this information. One of his options is adaptation of his behavior based on estimation of the control law K as an unknown parameter of the observation model p(u t |x t , K).
The NCC adds on an additional dimension to adaptive learning. The basic Kalman lter algorithm already utilizes the information from one's own past prediction errors. In contrast to learning from one's own errors, the violation of NCC calls for learning from the decisions and errors of others.
4 detection of NCC violation may be a separate topic of interest 
u t = Γ 0 (θ 2 )x t is the cumulative eect of the structural parameters Γ 0 (θ 2 ).
If there is u t that is observed, we have to extend the observation equation (3) to inform the estimates of θ and x t , similarly like in the previous subsection. Therefore, we augment measurement equation (3) to the form of
An example of a variable u t in DSGE models can serve income tax, consumption tax, or capital (property) tax revenues. 
Illustration
This section illustrates our point that using the whole disposable information may improve models' adaptability and estimation eciency. We use a simple real business cycle (RBC) model to generate articial data of private consumption, hours worked, investment, consumption tax receipts, and of disposable income, which form our set of disposable information. First, we assume that an econometrician (observer) uses only two series out of the complete information set. Next, we gradually expand the set that the econometrician utilizes. Then a similar exercise is repeated on actual data.
The RBC model is comprised of two sets of agents household and rm.
Households maximize their expected lifetime welfare E 0 [
The parameter σ > 0 is the measure of household's risk aversion, and the parameter β ∈ (0, 1) is the time discount factor. The household's welfare derives from consumption C t and leisure 1 − L t . The level of consumption is fueled by the habit H t , which depends on the past consumption and an i.i.d. habit shock H t = φC t−1 e εt , with φ ∈ (0, 1) and ε t ∼ N (0, σ 2 c ). Time spent by work L t causes disutility but it is compensated by the hourly real wage w t . The consumption is taxed by the government at the rate of τ c ∈ (0, 1). The household is the only owner of physical capital K t in the economy, which is, together with labor, a factor of production. Firms rent the capital and pay the households the interest r t in return, but the physical capital depreciates over time by the rate δ ∈ (0, 1). The household further receives the lump-sum transfers T t from the government, which operates on a balanced budget.
Firms maximize their prots Π t = Y t − r t K t−1 − w t L t by optimally hiring labor and capital to produce the consumption good Y t using Cobb-Douglas technology:
. A t is the total factor productivity and follows a log-linear AR(1) process: log A t = ρ log A t−1 + ε A t . The exogenous shock ε A t ∼ N (0, σ 2 A ) and we interpret it as the productivity shocks. α ∈ (0, 1) is the share of capital in production.
In equilibrium, all (labor, capital, and consumption goods) markets clear.
The dynamic equilibrium is characterized by the Euler equation for consumption, labor demand, resource constraint, and the exogenous supply of technology.
We use the following values to parameterize the equilibrium: α = 0.60,
The model is solved using the methodology proposed by King, Plosser and Rebelo (1988) . First, the model steady state is computed. Second, (6) - (9) are log-linearized around the steady state, and we obtain the model in the form of (1). Finally, the log-linear model is solved for the rational expectations E t (.). The result is the state equation (2), in which there are four endogenous variables C t K t L t A t , three of which are truly state variables, 6 and there are two structural shocks ε t ε A t .
Having the model, we simulate the set of disposable information. The set consists of the measures of private consumptionC t , hours workedL t , gross private investmentĪ t , sales tax receiptsT t , and disposable incomeDI t . We assume that the measures of these variables are published by a statistical oce. We do not measure any direct counterparts of the physical capital stock and the total factor productivity. Those variables remain latent states in the exercise.
The rst two observed variables are direct counterparts of the state variables C t and L t . The other three are denitions implicitly included in (6)-(9).
They are functions of the model's endogenous variables. The gross private investment is dened asĪ t = K t − (1 − δ)K t−1 , consumption tax receipts 6 [C t−1 , K t−1 , A t−1 ] are the truly state variables. They form the minimum-state-variable solution to the DSGE model. The equilibrium level of L t follows from the marginal rate of substitution between work and consumption, which is an intratemporal/static relationship.
areT t = τ c C t , and the disposable income is equal to equilibrium production
. All the variables are measured with an error that is i.i.d.
Monte Carlo Experiment
We assume that an econometrician (observer), who wants to estimate the model (6)- (9) decides to use the information contained only in the measures of consumptionC t and hours workedL t . He knows the structural model and its parametrization, and he wants to estimate the latent states K t and A t .
The assumptions of this experiment resemble a set up common to economic applications. The econometrician knows the disposable data, but he decides to use the measures that are naturally the closest to the model variables. Because there are no direct counterparts of K t nor A t in his database, he treats them as latent and estimate them. The structural parameters are known to him and thus the econometrician only seeks K t and A t . The
Kalman lter can deliver their optimal estimates.
The estimation results of this experiment are plotted in Figure 3 . The solid (pink) lines are the actual (simulated and known to us) series of K t (top panel) and A t (lower panel). The widest (blue) interval corresponds in both panels to the uncertainty of the estimates.
The econometrician's choice of observable variables results in the loss of eciency and consistency. We see that very often the estimate of capital or technology is indistinguishable from zero. The condence intervals are wide but at the same time may not include the actual series.
In the next step, the econometrician exploits the disposable information a bit more. He realizes that the statistical oce provides more data that is structurally linked to his model and they can help to inform his estimates.
The light intervals in Figure 3 show the gain in eciency and consistency when the disposable income is introduced in the set of observable variables, data on investment are similarly informative. The condence intervals for the capital stock and technology estimates shrink. The estimates become statistically signicant and more closely match the actual underlying trajectory of the latent variables. The tax revenues contribute only marginally to the estimates accuracy. (6)- (9) as parameterized in the text. The shocks are drawn from iids. In both panels, the solid line is the actual series (capital stock -top panel; technology -lower panel). The shaded bands around the actual series are the estimated 2std (smoothed) condence intervals conditioned on a set of observables. The baseline information set (Obs) consumption and hours work observed and the baseline set extended for the consumption tax receipts (Obs+T) yield the two widest condence intervals. The baseline set extended for disposable income (Obs+DI) or investment (Obs+I) provide the most narrow condence intervals and pin down the level of the actual states very precisely. In practice, it is dicult to make ad hoc claims which of available data add the most ecient information, but the model structure may help with the inference. Prior to any estimation we can evaluate the Fisher information matrix. We may infer how much new information we can expect to obtain when asking a particular set of data. It is a coherent way to summarize and analyze the information content for example presented in Figure 3 .
The Fisher Information matrix can help us to prioritize among variables we consider to select from the set of available information, which may be particularly helpful if we happen to have a constraint on available computation power. In contrast to the selection criteria proposed in Guerron-Quintana (2010) , the analysis of the Fisher information matrix appears as a cleaner way to prioritize among observable variables, because it does not require any prior data information.
Estimated Model
Now we repeat the above experiments with actual US data. In contrast to the prior analysis, we will see that, empirically, consumption, and hours Because model (6)- (8) is without nominal rigidities, we treat it as a growth model and estimate it on an annual frequency. Because of the non-stationary nature of the actual data, we modify the technological process to include a stochastic trend. Instead of (9) we now assume that the technology A t is labor augmenting and follows the rst-dierence stationary process with drift:
∆Ā > 0 is the drift term, which sets the economy on an exogenous but balanced growth path. Both capital and consumption grow at that rate in the long run.
The transitory parameters {φ, ρ} and the variances {ε 8 The other parameters are kept xed at their parameterized values mentioned above. We will not report their estimates and instead we again focus on the estimates of the capital stock K t and labor augmenting technology A t . 1968: 1973: 1978: 1983: 1988: 1993: 1998: 2003: 2008 Note: The top two panels show the relative eciency of the capital stock estimate (top left) and labor augmenting technology estimated (top right) when (i) the information on the growth of consumption and hours worked is used (model 1), and when that information is extended with (ii) the investment growth (model 2). The shaded areas are computed as 100(std(X t,model1 )/std(X t,model2 ) − 1).
Final Remarks
We reviewed the basic derivation of Kalman lter equations with the focus on the role of the natural condition of control. We were interested in what this condition implied for the estimation of DSGE models used in economics.
We provided a theoretically consistent justication for the use of all available (observable) information that can be structurally linked to the model. Under the assumption of information pooling, we illustrated that this leads to a signicantly improved estimate eciency.
The NCC can provide an alternative structural perspective for DSGE model developers. The model may be well specied but the NCC still can be violated. It is because the condition does not deal with the model structure per se, but rather with the ow of information in it.
In future work we would like to look at the possible avenues for formal testing of the NCC, which can be used for an empirical assessment of endogenous decision rules. DSGE models consist of optimal decision (control) rules, so each equation can be subject to testing. Another possible avenue for research is to relax the assumption of information pooling, and look at the case of an agent with signicant market power and private information. If the NCC should hold, the remaining market players can try to infer the private information encoded in the decisions of the dominant player and adapt to it.
